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The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in 
philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It 
is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of 
Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive 
the case as a puzzle.  Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-
two other researchers from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that 
their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship 
of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be 
taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship 
of Theseus story. 
 
1.- The test 
The story of the Ship of Theseus (SoT, from now on) is one of the most venerable 
conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle (Scaltsas 
1980, p. 152; Wiggins 1980, p. 97). Others deny that it is so (Smart 1972, p. 148; Smart 
1973, p. 27). It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in 
the SoT story, and also whether the case is considered puzzling across different cultures. 
Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other authors 
from different countries (RMS from now on) have undertaken the task of conducting 
empirical tests with a view to provide an answer to that open question.1  
According to RMS (2020), a puzzle is a thought experiment fulfilling a “provocative 
function” (p. 6), which they characterize in terms of two conditions: ambivalence and 
universality. 
 
1 RMS’s study is part of a larger project made possible through the support of a grant from the 
Fuller Theological Seminary / Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. 
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The ambivalence condition is stated as follows: “Readers should feel inclined to assert 
two prima facie inconsistent propositions” (p. 4). As regards universality, RMS point 
out that a puzzle “. . . must elicit an ambivalent state of mind in readers of all 
demographic, particularly of all cultural, backgrounds” (p. 4). 
The story of the SoT RMS presented to participants in their study is adapted from Rose 
(2015), and it contains the usual elements in the story: a ship whose planks are 
gradually replaced through maintenance till no original plank remains (‘Replacement’) 
and the ship that results from putting together the original planks that were preserved 
(‘Original Parts’). The story was translated into 17 languages and presented to 2,426 
people in 22 countries. The participants in the experiment were asked to read the story 
and to answer whether, in their view, Replacement or Original Parts was the original 
ship. Their degree of confidence was also measured. 
64% of the participants in the study thought that Replacement was the original ship. 
However, RMS note that, although there was a sharp majority in favor of Replacement, 
there was “quite a sizable minority—in the 30%-40% range—who thought that Original 
Parts was the original ship,” (p.18) a minority that expressed high confidence in their 
judgment. In any case, regardless of their answer, participants reported, in general, a 
high level of confidence.2 Moreover, with slight differences, the disagreement was 
universal across countries and cultures. 
 So, RMS conclude: “Our results do indeed suggest that the Ship of Theseus case is a 
puzzle: People across cultures are ambivalent about what to say in response to the case.  
But they do not suggest it is one that feels unsolvable or that it is “irreclaimably 
paradoxical,” placing us in a permanent state of indecision.  If this were the case, then 
we should have found that people were divided on whether Replacement or Original 
Parts was the Ship of Theseus and that they were not very confident in the option they 
ultimately settled on.  But this is not at all what we found.  The majority of sites offered 
a clear verdict and did so quite confidently” (p. 19). 
Ultimately, according to RMS, “the Ship of Theseus is a genuine puzzle but one that 
people can solve to their satisfaction” (p. 21). 
 
2.- The role of Ambivalence 
In our view, the experiment conducted by RMS does not grant any conclusion as 
regards the puzzling nature of the SoT story. To see this, let us first reflect on two, very 
different, puzzles: the Liar and the Trolley Problem. 
When we are asked whether the sentence “this sentence is false” is true or false, we can 
soon perceive the circle that leads to contradiction. And when we face the choice of 
 




either pushing the lever killing the one person or refraining from doing anything (thus 
letting five people die), both choices seem morally objectionable, in spite of the fact that 
both courses of action are supported by ethical principles that we rely on in ordinary 
situations.  
Each one of us feels indecision and ambivalence when confronted with these cases: for 
different reasons in each case, we simply do not know what to say. Arguably, the 
psychological reaction, the indecision and ambivalence that each of us can feel, is not 
what makes a given case a genuine puzzle, although it is a good indicator of the 
existence of a puzzle.3 That is why we think it is worthwhile to test, as RMS set to do, 
whether people are ambivalent about the story of the SoT. 
However, there is an important confusion in their procedure. The principle of 
ambivalence, as RMS state it, is ambiguous. The claim “readers should feel inclined to 
assert two prima facie inconsistent propositions” (p. 4) can be understood as requiring 
interpersonal disagreement (among different readers) or intrapersonal conflict or 
indecision, felt by each reader. Only the latter form of clash is arguably a good indicator 
of the presence of a puzzle. The paradigmatic cases of philosophical puzzles and 
conundrums, such as the Liar and the Trolley Problem, do reveal such intrapersonal 
conflict. 
What RMS show is that there is sharp interpersonal disagreement among different 
readers: 64% of participants thought that Replacement was the original ship whereas 
36% thought that Original Parts was the original ship (p. 13). And the disagreement is 
indeed sharp because in both cases participants were quite confident in their judgment 
(p. 17-18).  But the presence of sharp interpersonal disagreement does not qualify as 
evidence that we are confronted with a genuine puzzle.4 
If interpersonal disagreement were the mark of a philosophical puzzle then any 
disagreement that can generate philosophical discussion would constitute a puzzle. But, 
in general, studies that show that there is interpersonal disagreement about a subject 
matter are not presented as studies that reveal the puzzling nature of that subject matter. 
For instance, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2004) 
conducted an experiment using Kripke’s Gödel case (Kripke 1980). The results of that 
experiment, they argued, show that East-Asians are inclined to think that the man who 
proved incompleteness and was found dead in mysterious circumstances is the referent 
 
3 If we attend to RMS definition of a puzzle as a thought experiment that fulfills a provocative 
function, it would seem that ambivalence is for them a constitutive condition of a puzzle. We are 
more cautious, although we do consider that ambivalence is a good indicator. 
4 It might be even argued that RMS’s results militate against the conclusion that the SoT story 
constitutes a genuine puzzle, precisely because the participants reveal a high degree of 
confidence, incompatible with intrapersonal ambivalence (namely, it is not the case that they do 
not know what to say). We will address this issue in section three. 
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of the name ’Gödel’, whereas Westerners were not at all inclined to this response. 
Subsequently Edouard Machery, Christopher Olivola and Molly DeBlanc (2009) 
conducted a similar test in different countries that showed divisions within each culture. 
In each case, the authors did not present their results as providing evidence for the 
existence of a puzzle. They simply argued that those results constituted proof that 
substantial segments of the population do not agree with Kripke’s intuitions on the 
Gödel’s case.5 
These two studies purport to show that there is interpersonal disagreement as to who 
‘Gödel’ refers to.6 And, if the authors do not present the disagreements as a providing 
evidence for the existence of a puzzle, we think, is precisely because their study is not 
designed to show intrapersonal disagreement.7 
The SoT story is often presented as giving rise to a conflict with the transitivity of 
identity. One feels inclined to say that the SoT is Replacement and also that the SoT is 
Original Parts, but clearly Original Parts and Replacement are different. In general, 
showing that some people (perhaps a majority) think that, say, A is B and some other 
people (a substantial minority) think that A is C does not create any contradiction with 
the principle of transitivity of identity. Some people think that the author of the 
bestseller My Brilliant Friend (published under the name or nom de plume ‘Elena 
Ferrante’) is the contemporary historian Marcella Marmo and some other people think 
that the author is the writer Domenico Starnone.8 Both groups have a claim to being 
right, for there is evidence pointing in both directions. Clearly, Marcella Marmo is not 
Domenico Starnone, yet no one would conclude that this disagreement threatens the 
principle of transitivity of identity.  
Although these interpersonal disagreements may be part of interesting philosophical 
discussions they surely do not indicate the existence of puzzles. Likewise, the evidence 
that RMS collect as regards the story of the SoT is not an indicator of the presence of a 
puzzle.  
Now, the results of RMS test show that people disagree as regards the right answer. 
Indeed, they show that such disagreement occurs with high levels of confidence and 
 
5 In fact, the divisions reported by Machery, Olivola and De Blanc in India, Mongolia and 
France are very similar to those reported in the test of the SoT story. For instance, in Mongolia, 
66% lean one way and 34% the other, close to the 64% and 36% reported in the SoT test. 
6 There has been a long and lively discussion as to what the studies do show, but the issue is of 
no relevance for the purposes of this paper. 
7 Neither set of authors even ask participants for the degree of confidence in their answers. 







without indication of intrapersonal conflict. Thus, one might ask: do RMS show 
(unbeknownst to them) that the SoT story does not constitute a genuine puzzle after all? 
Not so.  
 
3.- The story and its presentation 
Let us think what would be a good presentation of the SoT story, the kind that we might 
easily find discussed in an undergraduate course in Philosophy. Ideally, the discussion 
proceeds in three steps. First, some story is told that invokes the principle that gradual 
replacement does not affect the identity of an object. For instance, a wall can have its 
bricks gradually replaced and still remain the same wall. Second, some other story is 
told that invokes the principle that disassembling and reassembling an object does not 
affect its identity. For instance, a watch can be disassembled and reassembled in order to 
clean it and yet remain the same watch. When the SoT story is then presented, the 
answers to the previous two stories play a role in leading us to think that both the 
gradually replaced ship and the reassembled ship have a claim to being the original ship. 
But that would violate the transitivity of identity.  
Pickup (2016) underscores that the three steps are instrumental in highlighting the 
puzzling character of the SoT story: in a situation in which an object is disassembled 
and reassembled the identity of the object in question seems unproblematic; a situation 
in which parts of an object are gradually replaced seems entirely unproblematic too. But 
then, in a situation that contains the previous two situations as parts, everything goes 
awry.  
If one is to see a puzzle in the SoT story, one has to see that both answers have a claim 
to being right. The principles that we use in everyday life to identify and reidentify 
objects lead us to a contradiction with an obvious principle such as the principle of 
transitivity of identity. As in the Trolley problem, two principles that justify very 
plausible answers in ordinary cases, produce a conflict.  
Asking the question RMS ask without the three step presentation does not highlight that 
preservation of identity under gradual replacement, and preservation of identity under 
disassemblage and reassemblage can conflict in situations such as the one described in 
the SoT story. 
Interestingly, it might be argued that it is an open question whether there is a 
hierarchical order between the principles that govern identification and reidentification 
of objects. One might even wonder if such a hierarchy would be sensitive to cultural 
background. Perhaps, one might argue, this is the reason RMS obtain the result that the 
majority of people are inclined towards a certain answer and with little hesitation. If the 
SoT story had been tested in the three step way suggested here, and if the results had 
been the same that RMS get (namely, interpersonal disagreement and high levels of 
confidence), then it could be argued that there is a hierarchy of principles and that 
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people disagree as regards which principle is prior. If that were the case, the SoT story 
would be interesting and challenging, but not a genuine puzzle. Yet, it is important to 
stress that the way RMS tell the story of the SoT is not useful as a test in that regard 
either. Testing the presence of a hierarchy requires collecting data about how principles 
that are used happily in some occasions are overridden in other occasions. Both the 
happy application of principles and the possible overriding application must be tested, 
and that would demand testing the story in the step by step way suggested here. 
 
4.- Conclusions 
We conclude that RMS’s test does not show that the story of the SoT is a puzzle because 
the data collected are data about interpersonal disagreement which, unlike intrapersonal 
conflict, are not good indicators of the presence of puzzles.  
In fact, the high level of confidence reported by the participants in the experiment might 
suggest that the story of the SoT constitutes no puzzle at all. However, the story that 
RMS present is simply not adequate to test the puzzling nature of the SoT.  
Hence, the test conducted by RMS has no bearing on the question as to whether the SoT 
constitutes a genuine philosophical puzzle, and it does not advance in any way the 
traditional discussion about this venerable story.  
Finally, we think that there is a general lesson to be learnt about puzzles and 
philosophical experiments. A lot of work in experimental philosophy has consisted in 
highlighting clashes of intuitions between groups of people (cultures, genders, the folk 
vs. experts…). All these studies rely crucially on the existence of interpersonal 
disagreement. Testing the presence of a puzzle, instead, should focus on intrapersonal 
conflict and therefore requires a different methodology. 
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